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Abstract 
This paper develops and estimates a behavioural model spanning two equity markets, with boundedly rational 
representative agents. These fund managers use three different types of information and change the relative 
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sources in previous periods. The model shows that the crisis is triggered in Thailand as a result of an increased 
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shown that the crisis spills to the Hong Kong market as a result of increased attention for foreign markets; 
therefore, there is evidence of shift-contagion.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The observation that an extreme financial event in a certain country can cause a chain 
of events in other, not only closely related, countries has triggered a vast line of research 
starting in the end of the 1990s; see, for instance the literature review of Claessens and 
Forbes (2001) and Kaminsky et al. (2003). Although the literature is diverse concerning the 
exact definition, the term used to describe this observation, is contagion. The commonly used 
definitions for contagion can be split in two broad groups. The first group considers the 
spread of crises across countries a result of the linkages that exist between countries, such as 
trade linkages, financial linkages, and common shocks. Forbes and Rigobon (2002) label this 
interdependence; the underlying assumption is that there are no structural changes during 
extreme events. The second type of definition is narrower in the sense that it states that the 
spread of shocks is not only the result of the every day linkages, but that crisis-contingent 
mechanisms come into play. That is, linkages between assets change during crisis periods. 
Forbes and Rigobon (2002) refer to this type of contagion as shift-contagion. Crisis-
contingent mechanisms can be based on multiple equilibria, endogenous liquidity shocks, and 
a political transmission mechanism. The underlying assumption is that the typical conduct of 
markets changes. The price of assets is, in the end, determined by agents trading in a financial 
market. The behaviour of agents forming the market thus changes during crises given that the 
degree of co-movement between assets changes during crisis periods. 
 A second strand of literature assuming that agents condition their behaviour on the 
state of the market, comparable to the crisis-contingent theories, is the heterogeneous 
expectations literature; see for instance Day and Huang (1990), Brock and Hommes (1998), 
Lux (1998), LeBaron (2006), and Hommes (2006) for an extensive overview. In this setting of 
bounded rationality, there are groups of agents who condition their expectations on different 
sources of information. The resulting market price is the weighted average of the expectations 
of the different groups. Usually there are two groups, fundamentalists and chartists, who base 
their expectations on economic fundamentals and technical analyses, respectively. Behaviour 
is state dependent as agents can change their strategy as how to form their expectations 
conditional on the past performance of that strategy. Consequently, the distribution of agents 
over the groups, thus the weights given to the various strategies in determining the market 
price, varies through time conditional on the goodness of fit of the different strategies. 
The combination of shift-contagion and heterogeneous agents has, to our best 
knowledge, never been explored.  Therefore, in this paper we develop a model inspired by the 
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heterogeneous agents literature in order to give an explanation for the notion of shift 
contagion. Instead of introducing heterogeneous agents, we propose a model with a 
boundedly rational representative agent who each period updates the weights she or he gives 
to different information sources. Also, instead of focusing on a single asset market, we 
introduce a system spanning multiple asset markets with explicit time varying linkages 
between the markets induced by investor behaviour. 
Studies by Allen and Taylor (1990), Taylor and Allen (1992) and Jongen et al. (2008) 
indicate that fund managers at large financial institutions base their expectations and 
subsequent trading behaviour on both economic fundamental and technical analyses. Since 
capital markets are dominated by large, often institutional, investors, it is safe to assume that 
all have equal access to information. Also, from Beine et al. (2003) we know that market 
participants have a tendency to imitate each other. Based on these insights, we model the 
market as being dominated by a boundedly rational but representative fund manager. The 
expectation and behaviour of the fund manager is not only based on fundamental and 
technical analysis, as in the heterogeneous agents literature, but also on foreign developments. 
Based on the existence of real and financial linkages between different markets, the fund 
manager also incorporates information from foreign markets. The source of observed price 
changes is evaluated each period by the fund manger, and the relative weights on the three 
different information sources for forming next periods expectation are adapted accordingly.  
The relation between the different asset markets in the model is established by 
introducing a third source of information for the fund manager, next to fundamental and 
technical, which is conditional on past returns in the foreign markets. By doing so, we 
incorporate the existence of linkages between the markets, while staying in the line of 
reasoning of the model that the market price is determined by a boundedly rational fund 
manager. Like the other sources, the relative weight on the international information in 
determining the market price changes through time. As the fund manager focuses more on 
foreign markets in forming expectations, the co-movement between the markets increases. 
Our model therefore combines the two definitions of contagion; there is interdependence 
because of the ever existing fundamental relation between markets, and there is shift-
contagion because this relation contains the flexibility to change over time.  
By explicitly modelling the behaviour of market participants, we can determine 
whether the focus on the foreign market changes during crises, so whether shift-contagion is 
present or not. If it is observed that the behaviour of market participants changes significantly 
during crises, i.e. if the weight on the foreign market becomes larger, it can be interpreted as 
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evidence of shift-contagion. In doing so, we develop a model that gives a behavioural 
underpinning, on a micro-level, of the notion of contagion. Furthermore, the model is shown 
to be vector auto regressive (VAR), with time-varying coefficients. Contrary to what is the 
case with a regular VAR, an economic model is underlying the empirical one, thus providing 
an economic intuition. The time variation in the coefficients is induced by the changing 
weights. 
 We estimate the model for two countries during the Asian crisis. By doing so, we 
attempt to shed some light on the (changing) mutual dependence between asset markets 
during the crises. Within the literature of heterogeneous agents models, the added value lies in 
the fact that we have a model with multiple asset markets and a boundedly rational fund 
manager basing expectations on three sources of information. Literature on heterogeneous 
agents models usually apply simulation techniques; the scarce papers that do confront the 
models with actual data use a relatively low frequency (monthly or lower). In this paper, the 
model is empirically estimated using high frequency data (daily). The contagion literature is 
enriched by the fact that we offer a totally different viewpoint on the notion of changing 
mutual dependence between markets. Also, a (micro) behavioural underpinning is suggested. 
In accordance with the results of Reitz and Westerhoff (2003, 2007), Boswijk et al. 
(2007), and De Jong et al. (2007), we find evidence of the use of different information sources 
and switching between them. All three sources are found to be used simultaneously, and the 
relative weights put on the information sources are found to be time-variant. Our results do 
not corroborate the most recent results concerning shift-contagion of e.g. Forbes and Rigobon 
(2002) and Candelon et al. (2005). As the weight on international information increases at the 
onset of the crisis, we find evidence of shift-contagion of the crisis in the Thai market to the 
Hong Kong market during the crisis period. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we develop the 
model. Section 3 describes the empirical literature of both contagion and heterogeneous 
agents models, and estimation and data issues involved in estimating the model. In Section 4 
we describe the estimation results and in Section 5 focuses on different issues of the Asian 
crisis. Section 6 concludes. 
 
 5
2. The Model 
 
In this Section we describe the non-linear dynamic model with multiple asset markets, 
which we will estimate for two equity indices during the Asian crisis. Our model is a direct 
descendant of the celebrated model of Brock and Hommes (1997, 1998) for the stock market. 
In this type of model, the market price is formed by the weighted average expectations of a 
number of heterogeneous groups. The weights are determined by the past performance of the 
different groups, so agents can change their strategy of how to form price expectations. Our 
addition is twofold; first, we introduce a boundedly rational representative agent with 
different information sources and, second, we allow the model to span multiple asset markets.  
 The step from heterogeneous agents with a single source of information each to a 
representative agent with multiple sources of agents is motivated by the fact that capital 
markets are dominated by large, often institutional, investors. For example, the Bank of 
International Settlement in their 2006 report states that two thirds of the trade, and thus the 
price formation, in foreign exchange take place between large financial institutions. Because 
the institutions are large, we can assume that they have equal aces to information; information 
costs and the like do not play a significant role. Allen and Taylor (1990, 1992) and Jongen et 
al. (2008) indicate that these large institutions base behaviour on a combination of factors, 
namely fundamental and technical analysis. Beine et al. (2003) state that financial institutions 
imitate each other based on reputation effects and strategic considerations. Therefore, the 
market does not consist of heterogeneous individuals with a single source of information, but 
a boundedly rational, but representative agent with multiple sources of information. 
 The basic heterogeneous expectations model described in Brock and Hommes (1997, 
1998) assumes that agents can invest in a risk-free asset and one risky asset. Westerhoff and 
Dieci (2006) and Chiarella et al. (2005) set up a model with interacting heterogeneous agents, 
who are able to invest in a risk-free asset and two risky assets. Westerhoff (2004) assumes 
that only chartists can switch between markets based on an information-cost argument. 
Westerhoff and Dieci (2006) show that the properties of two otherwise unrelated markets with 
common traders are related; Westerhoff (2004) and Chiarella et al. (2005) show that the 
existence of common investors can cause co-movement in markets. 
Contrary to the models with multiple asset markets of Westerhoff and Dieci (2006), 
Chiarella et al. (2005) and Westerhoff (2004), we do not assume that individual agents can 
invest in multiple markets, but we introduce a third source of information for our 
representative fund manager in local markets, next to the technical and fundamental 
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information. The third source of information consists of (past) movements of foreign markets. 
In this way we incorporate the existence of real and/or financial linkages between asset 
markets, while remaining in the logic of the model. The fund managers, who dominate the 
market, take the existence of other traders into account in forming expectations. As such, we 
can model the total market by only incorporating the largest group. This setup embeds all 
different forms of potential linkages, while the aforementioned papers with multiple asset 
market solely rely on the existence of financial linkages due to internationally operating 
investors. The dynamics in the weights put on the foreign information are left to determine the 
actual co-movement between the asset markets. 
The reason for investors to focus on foreign markets can be based on different 
motives. First of all, there can be real linkages (international trade, foreign direct investments) 
between the respective countries. In our case with two proximate countries, (Thailand and 
Hong Kong) this is clearly the case. Second, there can be financial linkages between countries 
causing the stock markets to be correlated. Westerhoff and Dieci (2006) show that 
internationally operating investors can cause correlations between markets based in liquidity 
needs. Furthermore, cross-listings introduce correlations. As Hong Kong, together with 
Singapore, is the financial centre of south-east Asia, there are numerous links to and fro the 
Hang Seng index. Finally, if both markets are hit by a common shock, markets will be 
correlated. This is not unlikely with countries with such geographical, cultural, and economic 
proximity as the ones in our sample. Given that fund managers know of these textbook 
linkages, it makes sense for this dominant market participant to take these into account when 
forming expectations. 
 As mentioned above, we assume that the fund managers expectation is formed by the 
weighted average expectation put forward by different information sources 
 
∑
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in which rt+1 is the return in period t+1 defined as Pt+1+yt+1 -Pt with Pt+1 the log real price in 
period t+1 and yt+1 log real dividends in period t+1; wh,t is the relative magnitude or weight of 
group h with ∑
=
=
H
h th
w
1 ,
1and E is the expectation operator. Furthermore, as proposed in De 
Grauwe and Grimaldi (2005), because the representative fund manager1 in makes up the 
                                                
1 Which are the three heterogeneous groups in the case of De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2005). 
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representative majority of the market and acts directly in accordance with its expectations, the 
realised return in period t+1 equals the average or market expectation plus a random shock 
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The fund manager expects dividends to follow a random walk with drift, i.e. ttt dyyE =+1 , with 
d the drift equal to one plus the average growth rate of dividends. Equation (2) can then be 
rewritten as 
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Given that d is the average growth rate of dividends, the )( 1 tt dyy −+ term is i.i.d since 
dividends are assumed to follow a random walk. Assuming that innovations to the dividend 
process are independent from shocks to the price process as a whole, we end up with 
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with 0=tEν and i.i.d. As indicated before, the weights wh,t are conditional on past 
performance of the different information sources. We use the procedure first proposed by 
Brock and Hommes (1997), which models the weights as a function of past fitness in a 
discrete choice model with multinomial logit probabilities 
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in which πh,t is the fitness of strategy h in period t and γ is the intensity of choice. The latter is 
(one of the) features of the model that illustrates the boundedly rational behavioural setup. In 
a neo-classical setting, only the information source that most accurately predicts the actual 
price change would be used. This source would always have a weight wh equal to one. In our 
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setup this can only occur as γ!∞, such that there is infinite sensitive to differences in 
forecasting accuracy. At the other extreme, so as γ=0, fund managers would not change 
information sources at all; the weights of all strategies would be uniformly distributed and 
equal to 1/H, with H the total number of strategies. The intensity of choice can therefore be 
interpreted as a measure of status-quo bias. 
The performance of the information sources πh,t+1 is modelled as ( ) 11, ++ ⋅ ttth rrE , as in 
Westerhoff and Dieci (2006)2. If both terms, i.e. the expected and the realized returns, have 
the same sign, the fitness measure is positive; opposite signs result in a negative profit. 
Therefore, predicting the correct (wrong) direction of change of the price level results in a 
positive (negative) fitness value. Furthermore, the absolute magnitude of the expectation 
works multiplicative. In other words, taking risks by having a large expectation in absolute 
sense can return in a large profit if the realized return is of the proper sign, but also in a large 
loss if the realized return is of the opposite sign. 
 The final step is to define the expectation formation rules based on the different 
information sources. We assume that fund managers perceive that there are three different 
sources of information relevant for the market. The first source, fundamental information, 
conditions expectations on the level of the market price compared to what is perceive to be 
the level of the fundamental price (which is perfectly visible to, and the same for, all agents in 
the market) 
 
−
−−
+
−−−
−+−=∆ )()( *112*1111, ttttttf PPPPPE θθ       (6) 
 
in which *tP is the fundamental price in period t. In order to introduce more flexibility, we 
allow the rule to respond differently to an overvaluation of the market vis-à-vis the 
fundamental +
−−
− )( *11 tt PP , compared to an under-valuation
−
−−
− )( *11 tt PP . Based on prospect 
theory by Kahnemann and Tversky (1979), an undervaluation will be corrected quicker than 
an overvaluation.  
The effect of the fundamental information depends on the sign and magnitude of θi. If 
-1<θi<0, expectations based on fundamental information are mean-reverting and thus 
stabilizing; however, as θi>0 they are destabilizing as the price is driven away from the 
                                                
2 In fact, Westerhoff and Dieci model the fitness as Di,t(exp(Pt)-exp(Pt-1)) in which Di,t is demand for the asset. 
However, their demand is modelled as our forecasting rules are modelled. Furthermore, exp(Pt)-exp(Pt-1) is a 
variation to our log price difference. 
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fundamental price. A value of θi<-1, finally, represents overshooting. The market price will 
oscillate explosively around the fundamental price. 
 The second source, technical or chartist information, conditions expectations on past 
price movements 
 
( ) ( )−
−
+
−−
∆+∆=∆ 12111, ttttc PPPE αα        (7) 
 
Depending on the sign and magnitude of αi chartist expectations are either stabilizing or 
destabilizing. Values of 01 <<− iα  imply stabilizing behaviour since previous periods price 
movements are (partly) reversed. If 0>iα , behaviour is destabilizing since past movements 
are (partly) extrapolated; 1>iα always implies explosive expectations
3. Again, we introduce 
flexibility by introducing an asymmetry between positive ( )+
−
∆ 1tP  and negative ( )−−∆ 1tP  past 
returns. 
 The third and final source of information is international and conditions the 
expectation on past returns in the foreign market.  
 
( ) ( )−
−
+
−−
∆+∆=∆ 12111, tttti PPPE ββ        (8) 
 
in which tP is the price in the foreign market. In terms of real linkages, the correlation 
between the markets is positive if one country benefits from e.g. another countries growth by 
increased exports ( 0>iβ ). A negative correlation is also possible as two countries are e.g. 
competing on the world market ( 0<iβ ). Similar reasoning can be thought of concerning 
financial linkages. For example, an international investor might pull funds out of country A 
because of liquidity issues when stock prices in country B go down. This causes a positive 
correlation between country A and B. Because of the different possible linkages that exist 
between the markets, the reaction to positive and negative shocks is again asymmetric. The 
fund manager thus incorporates the existence of other market participants, such that it 
becomes a representative agent. 
 Equations (4) to (8) can be combined to form one equation representing the change in 
the asset price as a function of lagged price changes, both domestic and foreign, and 
                                                
3 Oscillative explosive for <-1 and explosive for >1 
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fundamental prices. This model can be applied to each stock market, such that it can be used 
to describe multiple markets simultaneously, next to each other, with explicit cross-linkages. 
As we focus on the interaction between two specific markets in this paper, we write the model 
as a system of two interacting equations, in which each equation represents a local version of 
the model. Rewritten in matrices, this results in 
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Variables and coefficients with an upper bar represent foreign equivalents of local 
variables and coefficients. Basically, the model formed by Equation (9) is vector auto 
regressive (VAR) with time-varying coefficients that are conditional on past price 
movements, with tP∆ and tP∆ as endogenous and )(
*
11 −− − tt PP and )(
*
11 −− − tt PP
4 as exogenous 
variables. The time variation in the coefficients is a function of the fit of the three different 
expectation formation rules. Contrary to a normal VAR, which is a method of determining the 
relation between variables without imposing an underlying (economic) model, the VAR 
proposed here is formed by modelling micro-behaviour of individual agents. Therefore, it 
provides an intuitive explanation for a normally (economic) theory-lacking VAR. Time-
variation in the coefficients is often highly parameterized, by, for example, a Markov chain. 
In our case, the time variation is relatively parsimonious, and is based on an economic 
interpretation.  
The time variation in the coefficients is also the mechanism driving contagion in our 
setup. The correlation between the markets is given by coefficient βi in the international 
information times the weight wi,t put on this source (in both markets). Without switching 
between information sources, the correlation would be constant. However, after introducing 
                                                
4 To be more precise, the misalignment is not truly exogenous; the fundamental price is strictly exogenous, but 
the lagged price is predetermined. 
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switching, the correlation between markets also becomes time varying. With increasing 
variability in market A, the accuracy of forecasting based on international information in 
market B will go up because the returns of the two markets will be more similar5. This is still 
interdependence, because weights do not change; the correlation does not change, but returns 
are more similar as a result of the increase in variance (see Forbes and Rigobon, 2002). As 
profits resulting from the international information increase, more weight will be put on the 
international information. Increasing weight (with constant coefficients) implies a higher 
correlation between the markets; the product wi,tβi increases. Therefore, an increase in 
volatility in one market (for example caused by a crisis) in our boundedly rational setup 
causes contagion. 
 
 
3. Empirical Considerations 
 
3.1 Empirical Literature Review 
The early empirical papers on contagion are unanimous in their conclusions 
concerning the existence of contagion. Irrespective of the method and definition they employ, 
contagion is found to be significant. For instance, King and Wadhwani (1990) find increased 
cross-market correlations between the U.S., U.K., and Japan after the U.S. stock market crash. 
Lee and Kim (1993) extend this analysis and find similar results. Increased co-movement is 
also found after the 1994 Tequila crisis and 1997 Asian crisis by Calvo and Reinhart (1995) 
and Baig and Goldfajn (1998). Using a limited dependent variable setup, Eichengreen et al. 
(1996) and Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000) find increased probability of a crisis after another 
country has been hit by a crisis. 
Forbes and Rigobon (2002) however, find evidence for interdependence, not shift-
contagion. That is, corrected for the increased volatility in asset returns during crises, the 
correlation between markets did not increase during the Asian and Mexican crises and the 
1987 U.S. stock market crash. Using the same correction method as Forbes and Rigobon 
(2002), Lomakin and Paiz (1999) conclude that most shocks are transmitted through non-
crisis-contingent channels. Likewise, Candelon et al. (2005) reject the null hypothesis of shift-
contagion after the 1994 Mexican Peso crisis and 1997 Asian crisis after adjusting for 
                                                
5 This is exactly why Forbes and Rigobon (2002) argue that one should take the increase in volatility into 
account when examining changing correlation between markets during crises. 
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heteroskedasticity; Rigobon (2003) and Gravelle et al. (2006) find little evidence for shift-
contagion in Latin-American bond markets. 
The heterogeneous expectations literature is focused on three issues. The first topic is 
the dynamic properties of the nonlinear models. Given the nonlinear setup, the behaviour of 
the model depends heavily on the magnitude of coefficients and the starting values in a 
simulation setup. Chiarella et al. (2002) and Chiarella and He (2002) characterize the 
parameter space of the models according to the local stability or instability of the equilibrium. 
The second topic is the replication of stylized facts known from financial markets. By using 
simulations combined with time-series techniques, Lux (1996), LeBaron et al. (1999) and De 
Grauwe and Grimaldi (2005, 2006) show that models with heterogeneous interacting agents 
are capable of replicating the stylized facts of financial markets (i.e., extreme values, volatility 
clustering, disconnection from the fundamental, excess volatility). The third topic 
comprehends the estimation of models with heterogeneous interacting agents. This is a 
relatively new and unexplored topic since the estimation of the non-linear switching 
mechanism proofed to be difficult. Vigfusson (1997) and Ahrens and Reitz (2005) have 
circumvented the problem of estimating the non-linear switching mechanism by replacing it 
by a Markov regime-switching approach. Baak (1999) and Chavas (2000) find significant 
evidence of agent heterogeneity in the beef market. Winker and Gilli (2001) estimate a 
heterogeneous agents model by minimizing a loss function consisting of the kurtosis and 
ARCH-estimates of the simulated data by adjusting the coefficients of the model. Reitz and 
Westerhoff (2003, 2007) directly estimate a model of chartists and fundamentalists with 
switching mechanism for daily exchange rates from 1980 to 1996. Boswijk et al. (2007) 
rewrite the model of Brock and Hommes (1997) and estimate it directly for the S&P500 using 
a non-linear least squares technique. De Jong et al. (2007) estimate a heterogeneous agents 
model for the EMS exchange rates. All papers find evidence in favor of the heterogeneous 
agents models; both trader heterogeneity and, to a lesser extend, switching believes, are 
found. 
 
3.2 Data and Sample 
We have chosen to focus on the Asian crisis for a number of reasons. First of all, 
especially during crises, we expect the heterogeneous agents model to perform well, as there 
is clearly a shift in sentiment during extreme events. Therefore, introducing different types of 
investor behaviour and flexibility to switch between types should be beneficial in explaining 
the evolution and spread of crises. The Asian crisis is chosen as it is more widespread than 
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previous crises in terms of both the geographical scope and the impact on the real side of the 
economies involved. Given the central role of the fundamental price in our model, the Asian 
crisis provides an appropriate case study. The Thai stock exchange, Bangkok S.E.T., and the 
Hong Kong stock exchange, the Hang Seng, have been chosen because the first is the country 
in which Asian crisis officially started with the attack on the Thai Baht in July 1997. The 
latter is chosen as Hong Kong, together with Singapore, is the financial centre of the south-
east Asian region, a leading stock exchange. Furthermore, Forbes and Rigobon (2002) note 
that it was not until the crash of the Hong Kong market in October 1997 that the press started 
to focus on Asia and that the words crisis and contagion appeared. Corsetti et al. (2005) 
follow Forbes and Rigobon (2002) in this respect.  
All raw data used in this paper are taken from Datastream. We use daily data from 
February 1981 to December 2006, which are 6760 observations. This sample is chosen 
because we want to focus on the potentially changing behaviour of agents during the build-up 
of the crisis, the crisis, and its aftermath. 
 
3.3 Fundamental Price 
In order to construct a fundamental price, which is used in determining the expectation 
of fundamentalists, we consider a dynamic version of the classical Gordon growth model for 
equity valuation. Gordon (1962) states that the price of equity tP is equal to 
 
tt Ygr
gP
−
+
=
1              (10) 
 
in which g is the growth rate of dividend, r the discount rate and Yt dividends. One of the 
issues concerning this model is the period over which to consider the growth and discount 
rates. In our boundedly rational setup, agents cannot use future information in order to 
determine the current fundamental value; that is, g and r in period t can only contain 
information up to period t. Therefore, we make the model dynamic by assuming that g and r 
are time-varying. To be more specific, the growth rate g in period t is the average over all 
available past values until period t and the discount rate r is the expected (i.e. average) return 
in period t, determined from past values until period t. Thus, gt and rt are rolling averages of 
the growth rates of dividend and returns, respectively. 
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 Fama and French (2002) state that the average stock return r is the sum of the average 
dividend yield, ( )1/ −tt PYE , plus the average rate of capital gain, ( )11 /)( −−− ttt PPPE . The 
Gordon model implies that the average rate of capital gain is equal to the average growth rate 
of dividends, g. Therefore, Equation (10) simplifies to 
 
 ( ) ttt
t
t YPYE
gP
1/
1
−
+
=           (11) 
 
in which gt is the average growth rate of dividend and ( )1/ −tt PYE  is the average dividend 
yield (both averages up to period t). 
 In order to create a fundamental price for our two markets, we applied Equation (11) 
to the stock price indices of Thailand, the Bangkok S.E.T. and Hong Kong, the Hang Seng. 
For Yt we use earnings instead of dividends since we believe that earnings are less affected by 
management choices compared to dividends6. This is especially the case in recent years with 
respect to the increasing importance of firms who enter the stock market on the basis of 
expected future dividends (i.e. IT-firms). Nominal data is discounted using CPI. To create the 
rolling averages of the growth rate gt and earnings yield ( )1/ −tt PYE , we used as much data as 
was available to us, so assuming that agents have equal access to information. For Thailand 
the starting point is 1975; for Hong Kong 1973. The sample we concentrate on when 
estimating is 1981  2006, so the rolling averages used in our sample are based on a relatively 
large number of observations, also at the start of the sample. Earnings data are updated 
weekly, such that our fundamental stock price is also updated weekly.  
 ________________________
Insert Figure 1 Here 
________________________
 
 
 Figure 1 displays the log real market price and fundamental price determined using the 
dynamic Gordon model as described above for 1981 - 2006. The Hang Seng market price 
oscillates relatively close around the fundamental price during the entire sample. Clearly 
recognizable is the Asian crisis in 1997 and 1998, when the index loses 58% of its value, 
starting in October 1997 with the attack on the Hong Kong Dollar and the accompanying 
interest rate hikes in Hong Kong to defend the currency board. Remarkable is that only 28% 
                                                
6 Fama and French (2002) note that one can use any variable that is cointegrated with the stock price. 
 15
of the drop is a correction to the fundamental price. As a result of the sharp drop, the 
fundamental price itself also decreases in 1998, while the market price is rising again.  
The picture for Thailand differs considerably. Striking is the bubble period from 1987 
until 1996, reflecting the immense foreign capital inflows into the country at that time in 
reaction to the liberalization of the capital account. Just before the decline in May 1996, the 
market is 85% overvalued relative to the Gordon-based fundamental. During the decline, from 
May 1996 until August 1998, the market loses 85% of its value. The immense drop in stock 
value causes the fundamental value to drop as well. After the correction, the market value 
remains close to the fundamental, and is actually considerably undervalued for a number of 
years. Both the Thai and Hong Kong market start climbing again halfway 1998. Note that the 
decline in the stock market in Thailand (May 1996) commences well before the attack on the 
pegged exchange rate (July 1997).  
 
 ________________________
Insert Table 1 Here 
________________________
 
 
 Table 1 presents the summery statistics of the realized (log real) market prices and 
their first differences (so the return in the model), the constructed fundamental price, and the 
misalignment (i.e. the difference between market and fundamental price). The descriptive 
statistics confirm the image from the graphs. For Hong Kong we find that the mean, median, 
and standard deviation of the market price are significantly higher than the fundamental price. 
Both series are integrated of order one, and cointegrated7. The fact that the Thai market is 
overvalued during a large part of our sample period causes the mean and median of the market 
price to be significantly larger compared to the fundamental price. Range and standard 
deviation are also significantly higher for the market price. The market and fundamental 
prices for Thailand are both integrated of order one and cointegrated6. 
 Despite the crash in the Hong Kong market, the average return is 0.02% positive 
over the total sample; for Thailand this is 0.007%. The variability of the Bangkok S.E.T. 
return is significantly smaller than of the Hang Seng return given the range and standard 
deviation. The positive trends for Hong Kong and Thailand are reflected in the signs of the 
                                                
7 Johanssen cointegration test indicates one cointegrating vector. 
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skewness. Black Monday in October 1987 causes the Hang Seng index to decrease by 40%8; 
this single observation affects the abovementioned results somewhat. 
 The mean misalignment is significantly different from zero for Hong Kong, implying 
that the market is, on average, overpriced. The Bangkok market is significantly overpriced as 
well; the maximum overvaluation and variability in the misalignment is also larger compared 
to Hong Kong.  
 
3.4 Estimation Issues 
As indicated in Section 2, our model is basically a VAR with time varying 
coefficients. Standard VARs can be consistently estimated by using equation-by-equation 
OLS. However, because of the non-linearities induced by the switching mechanism, we chose 
to estimate the model using equation-by-equation maximum likelihood. Also because of the 
non-linear structure of the model, the estimation results appeared highly sensitive to the 
starting values of the estimation procedure; especially the intensity of choice parameter 
appeared to be the source of this sensitivity. To resolve this issue, we performed a grid-search 
over all dimensions using the log-likelihood as selection criterion, such that we were 
ascertained that the results represented a global maximum. 
 The estimation process consists of a number of sub-analyses. First of all we estimate 
the model without switching mechanism in order to test whether the three information sources 
are used at all. Second, we add the switching mechanism to see whether there is also 
switching between the sources. A comparison between these static and dynamic cases can 
show us whether the switching mechanism is able to add significantly to the fit of the model. 
As a second differentiation we estimate the model for three different sub-periods, pre-crisis, 
crisis, and post-crisis, next to the total sample. This gives an impression of the robustness of 
the estimation results. Furthermore, given the fairly long sample, market behaviour might 
have changed altogether. The results to these tests are presented in the next Section. 
 
 
4. Empirical Results 
 
The results of estimating the model described in Section 2 using the fundamental price 
and estimation procedure developed in Section 3 are presented in this Section. We first focus 
                                                
8 A dummy was added to the analyses for this date, as the model did not converge. 
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on the estimated coefficients in two cases: with and without switching mechanism. By doing 
so, we attempt to stress the importance of the non-linear structure of the model, i.e. the 
possibility of the fund manager to adapt its forecasting strategy. Second the estimation results 
of the sub samples are presented and finally we examine the development and characteristics 
of the weights wi,t attached to the different sources of information in expectation formation. 
 
4.1 Estimation Results 
Table 2 presents the estimation results of the model described by Equation (9) with 
and without switching mechanism. In terms of the model, without switching implies that γ=0; 
the distribution of weights over the different sources is uniform and constant through time, i.e. 
wh,t=1/3 th,∀ . With switching implies that the switching parameter γ is estimated 
simultaneously with the expectation formation function. 
 
 ________________________
Insert Table 2 Here 
________________________
 
 
Concentrating on the linear case first (left two columns), we observe in general that all three 
sources are significantly used in both the Thai and Hong Kong stock exchanges.  
Fundamental information is only stabilizing in case of an overvaluation for Hong 
Kong (negativeθ 1) and in case of an undervaluation for Thailand (negativeθ 2). In case of an 
overvaluation in Thailand or an undervaluation in Hong Kong, the fundamentals are 
destabilizing given the positive θ 1 for Thailand and positive θ 2 for Hong Kong. The 
magnitudes of the coefficients are relatively small, and indicate that around 0.4% of the 
misalignment is translated to tomorrows price change. This modest magnitude is the result of 
the daily frequency; it is known that mean-reversion to the fundamental occurs only in the 
long run, and will therefore not be particularly strong at the daily frequency. The coefficients 
for under-valuation are significant for both countries. 
 All but one technical analysis coefficients are positive, indicating that this source 
extrapolates recent price changes (i.e. 0>iα ). Only negative price changes in Hong Kong are 
(partly) reversed, leading to stabilizing dynamics in that case. The magnitude of the 
coefficients indicates that on average one third of the price shock of today is transferred to 
tomorrow. Coefficients for Thailand appear to be somewhat larger in absolute value. In 
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addition, positive shocks are extrapolated stronger than negative shocks; this difference is 
significant for both indices. All of the coefficients of the chartist information are significant, 
indicating that (this form of) technical analysis is indeed broadly applied in these markets. 
This is in a way surprising because returns in financial markets are known not to contain any 
autocorrelation.  
 The results for the third and final source, international information, indicate that the 
fund managers are indeed looking at other markets; there is significantly positive correlation 
between the stock exchanges of Thailand and Hong Kong, 0>iβ and significant for all but 
one case. A positive return in the foreign market in period t-1 results in a positive return in the 
home market in period t. Managers in Hong Kong incorporate positive shocks from Thailand 
more than negative shocks; in Thailand this is reversed, positive shocks from Hong Kong are 
less strong incorporated than negative shocks. Both these differences are significant. Finally, 
it appears that the focus on Hong Kong by Thai investors is somewhat stronger than vice 
versa, on average. 
The fact that there is positive correlation between the two stock markets is an 
indication that there is interdependence between the two markets on average over the total 
sample period. Given that the international information is significantly applied implies that 
past returns from the foreign market contain information on returns of the home market. We 
cannot conclude anything about shift-contagion from these results, because the coefficients 
are estimated over the total sample period, and therefore represent an average effect. 
 Concerning the non-linear case, so estimating the system with switching mechanism, 
we observe in the two columns on the right hand side of Table 2 that the coefficients for the 
three sources remain highly comparable. This is especially the case for the significant 
coefficients (i.e., chartists and international). Results for fundamental info change, but remain 
relatively weak. Introducing the possibility for fund managers to switch between information 
sources thus does not seem to have an impact on the weight they give to certain pieces of 
information when forming expectations. 
 The intensity of choice parameter γ  is negative and significant for both Hong Kong 
and Thailand. The negative signs imply that the weight attached to information with a 
relatively good forecasting ability in period t is decreased in period t+1. In other words, 
sources that yield better forecasts than competing sources in a given period perform worse 
than the other sources in the next period, such that the fund manager moves uses less of the 
well performing information as they know it will not perform well the next period. The higher 
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absolute magnitude of γ in Hong Kong compared to Thailand implies that traders are more 
sensitive to differences in performance between sources; they are more inclined to change 
strategy in response to a difference in forecasting performance. Finally, we observe that the 
log-likelihood for Hong Kong increases significantly after introducing the switching 
mechanism; flexibility therefore adds to the power of the model. For Thailand there is no 
significant difference in the likelihood; however, as the intensity of choice parameter is 
significant, switching does appear to be relevant. 
 The fact that we find significant coefficients for all three sources of information 
simultaneously makes us conclude that the agents active on the Thai and Hong Kong stock 
exchanges indeed use a combination of the proposed strategies. If the representative agent 
would use only one source, we would not have found significant coefficients for more than 
one at the same moment. Furthermore, the fact that the switching parameters are both 
significant and that the model fit is significantly higher in the switching case implies that there 
are not only heterogeneous information sources used on the market, but that the relative 
weight put on the different types of information also changes through time. Agents thus 
switch between strategies. 
These results are consistent with the results of Boswijk et al. (2005), Reitz and 
Westerhoff (2003), and De Jong et al. (2007). All three papers find evidence of heterogeneous 
behaviour in the S&P500 and the major foreign exchange markets. Boswijk et al. (2005) find 
two groups of fundamentalists who differ in their mean-reversion coefficients; significant 
switching, however, is not found. Reitz and Westerhoff (2003) find a group of chartists and a 
group of fundamentalists, including significant and rapid switching between the groups. De 
Jong et al. (2007) show the existence of different groups and the importance of switching 
during crisis periods.  
Our results are not yet directly comparable to the contagion literature, because the use 
of the international information in both countries does not provide a firm conclusion 
concerning shift-contagion; it only indicates significant interdependence on average during 
the total sample period. The significant switching is a first indication that the importance of 
the international source possibly changes over time, though. This would imply that the 
correlation between the markets is also time-varying, thus pointing towards shift-contagion. 
However, it could also be the case that managers only switch between chartist and 
fundamental information, leaving the correlation between the two stock markets constant. 
Also, contagion refers to the change in correlation during extreme periods, or crises. The 
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sheer observation of time-variation does not say anything about the timing of these changes. 
We will look further into these matters surrounding the Asian crisis in Section 5. 
 
4.2 Estimation Results Sub-Samples 
 
 ________________________
Insert Table 3 Here 
________________________
 
 
 Table 3 presents the estimation results of our model for three sub-samples, the pre-
crisis period (1981  1990), which includes the massive inflow of foreign capital, the crisis 
period (1991  1999), and the post-crisis period (2000  2006). Estimations represent the 
model with switching mechanism.  
 The pre-crisis period shows strong use of technical analyses, given the high and highly 
significant α-coefficients. The extrapolation is stronger in this early period compared to the 
total period. International information is only significantly used in the Thai market; shocks 
from Bangkok are not transmitted to Hong Kong, which is opposite to the total sample. The 
switching parameter finally again turns up negative and significant. The magnitude of this 
intensity of choice is, especially for Thailand, lower in absolute sense compared to the total 
sample. During the crisis-period, behaviour changes somewhat. Technical analysis remains 
strong, albeit somewhat less so than in the pre-crisis period. Most striking difference is the 
fact that the Hong Kong market starts incorporating information from the Thai market; it 
remains equally important in the Thai market. The intensity of choice in Thailand rises 
considerably. The post-crisis period, finally, shows a different image altogether. Chartist 
information only remains significant for Thailand, while it is only marginally present for 
Hong Kong. International information only turns up significantly for negative shocks in both 
markets; it also turns negative for Hong Kong. The intensity of choice parameters both 
become very large in absolute sense, but lose their significance. 
 The fact that the parameters of the expectation formation rules change considerably 
through time, is another indication that there is indeed time variation in the way market 
participants form their expectations. So, next to the switching induced by the model, we 
observe time variation in a broader perspective. Given that also the coefficients for the 
international information change over the three sub-samples, the correlation between the 
markets is different in the three periods. In other words, while the correlation between 
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markets in our model changes due to changing weights, the correlation changes in this case 
due to changes in the expectation formation rule itself, i.e. the β-coefficients. Also, the 
behaviour of agents concerning switching changes through time, given the changing intensity 
of choice parameter.  
The use of fundamental information remains relatively modest through time, as a 
result of our high frequency data. The importance of technical analyses, on the other hand, 
appears to decrease over the three sub-periods considered. This can be explained by the fact 
that the liquidity of these markets increases through time; developed financial markets are 
characterized by the absence of auto-correlation. We recognize this particularly in our results 
for the Hong Kong market, which is obviously by far the larger and more developed market. 
The relatively strong autocorrelation during the middle period can be explained by the crisis. 
This causes prices to move in a similar direction (down, in this case) for longer periods on 
end. Striking is also the change in coefficients for international information. The first period 
only shows transmission of shocks from Hong Kong to Thailand. This can be explained by 
the fact that the Thai market was still very small in that period and therefore unimportant for 
Hong Kong, while the Hong Kong market developed itself into a financial hub. The crisis 
period shows strong transmission in both directions; in other words, there is evidence of 
contagion, the correlation between the markets increases during the crisis by the increase in 
internationalist coefficients. This does not yet take into account the change in weights on the 
internationalist rule. The international focus disappears again for a large part in the post-crisis 
period. 
 
4.3 Weights 
The estimation results indicate that the representative agent in the market that has a 
time-varying forecasting strategy. In this subsection we will analyze the development and 
distribution of the weights through time, in order to determine the effect of the crisis. 
Furthermore, it allows us to draw inferences concerning the potential shift-contagion. 
 
 ________________________
Insert Figure 2 Here 
________________________
 
 
 Figure 2a displays the evolution of weights wh,t estimated by the model over the total 
sample period. The daily weights shift between zero and one, and oscillate around the uniform 
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distribution of one-third. There appear to be clusters of high volatility in the weights 
surrounding the periods in which volatility in the returns themselves is high. For example, 
there is an increase in volatility in 1993/1994, and very clearly a volatile period around the 
crisis in 1997/1998. For Hong Kong, the volatility appears to be highest for the technical 
information, followed by the fundamental information, and is clearly lower for the 
international information. As a result of the smaller intensity of choice (in absolute terms), the 
volatility in the weights is smaller for Thailand compared to Hong Kong. There does seem to 
be much difference between the three sources.  
 The plots of the smoothed weights9 in Figure 2b show a clearer image of the market 
dynamics. Because of the smoothing we observe a small band, with weights again moving 
around one-third, but during different periods we do observe very pronounced shifts. For 
example, during the Asian crisis we observe a strong rise in the use of technical analyses in 
Hong Kong, and a strong rise in fundamental analyses in Thailand. We will look further into 
this mechanism in Section 5. Table 4 presents descriptive statistics of the daily strategy 
weights. The numbers illustrate the findings from Figure 2 somewhat more. 
 
 ________________________
Insert Table 4 Here 
________________________
 
 
Mean values of the weights for both Hong Kong and Thailand are close to one-third 
for all periods, i.e. none of the sources is dominant or is put aside for long periods on end. The 
lowest mean value we observe is for the post-crisis period chartist information in Thailand 
(0.318). This illustrates the increasing quality of the market, as we have seen in Table 3. The 
range and standard deviations move in accordance with the magnitude of the intensity of 
choice; higher intensity of choice results in a higher variability and range of the weights. 
Generally weights range between zero and one; exceptions are the pre-crisis periods for both 
markets.  
By interpreting the correlations between the weights, we get a general picture 
concerning the switching tendencies of the fund manager. The correlation coefficients are 
generally negative, reflecting the fact that the weights sum up to one. Also because of the fact 
that the three weights sum up to one, there exists something like triangular-arbitrage. This 
                                                
9 Smoothed weights are 3-months moving averages of the daily weights. 
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can be most clearly illustrated by the pre-crisis sample for Hong Kong. There we observe that 
correlations between the importance of fundamental and technical information, and technical 
and international information, are close to minus one. As a result, the correlation between 
international and fundamental information is close to positive one.  
In the Hong Kong market, switching is heaviest between fundamental and technical 
analysis, followed by switching between technical and international information. The 
resulting correlation between international and fundamental is generally low, meaning that the 
fund manager does not often change between these sources. This pattern can also be roughly 
observed in the Thai market. 
 
5. The Asian Crisis 
In order to examine the ability of the model to give an explanation of the notion of 
contagion, we are focusing on the period directly surrounding the Asian crisis in 1997 and 
1998. By examining the evolution of the weights directly prior to the crisis, especially the 
weight on international influences, we will be able to judge the event that triggered the crisis. 
Furthermore, given that the weights on international information are an indication of the 
correlation between the markets, it will allow us to conclude about the existence of 
interdependence or contagion.  
 
5.1 Evolution of Weights 
 
 ________________________
Insert Figure 3 Here 
________________________
 
 
Figure 3 shows a close-up of the evolution of the three time-series of (smoothed) 
weights for Hong Kong and Thailand around the time the markets started crashing. This is 
1997 for Hong Kong, and 1996 for Thailand. For both markets, there is a clear turning point 
on which relative tranquillity changes into high volatility. Weights are distributed around one 
third until August 1997 in the Hong Kong market, after which we see a surge in technical 
analysis, bringing the index down. In the months prior to this, it can be observed that 
fundamental and international effects gain influence at the expense of chartist influence. As 
the market was overvalued at that time (see Figure 2) and the Thai market was already falling, 
the increase in fundamental and international weights increases the downward pressure on 
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prices. As the market was in an upswing, technical analysis provided upward pressure to 
price. When the difference between the chartist weight versus the fundamental plus 
international weight became too large, prices started falling. This negative trend was picked 
up by the technical analysis, which extrapolated this, causing the large increase in weight on 
chartism.  
 The story for the Thai market is somewhat more straightforward. Until July 1996, 
weights are distributed around one third. Because of a sharp increase in the use of the 
fundamentalist rule, the price starts dropping. This drop is picked up by technical analysts, as 
can be seen by the increase in weight on technical analyses in August 1996. The increase in 
chartism is only temporary; fundamentalism continues to rise until the market price reaches 
the fundamental price, so the over-pricing has vanished. 
 In terms of contagion, we observe that the Hong Kong market indeed falls as a result 
of the crisis in Thailand; the focus on international information increases prior to the start of 
the crisis in Hong Kong. However, the fall of the market is not only triggered by this 
contagion effect, but also by the mean-reverting dynamics induced by fundamental analyses.  
 
 
6. Conclusions 
In this paper we combine insights from the contagion literature and the heterogeneous 
expectations literature in order to get a better understanding on market-dynamics during 
financial market crises. For this end, we developed and estimated a dynamic model with a 
boundedly rational representative agent for the asset market. The representative agent, a fund 
manager, forms expectations based on three sources of information: economic fundamental, 
technical, and international. The relative importance of each source is time varying 
conditional on its impact on price in the previous period. The notion of contagion is 
incorporated by modelling two such models next to each other; the fact that the representative 
fund manager in both markets conditions its expectations on information from the other 
market introduces conditional interaction between the two risky assets.  
The model reduces to a VAR with time-varying coefficients and an economic 
underpinning. This time variation is induced by the fact that the fund manager adapts the 
weight it puts on the different sources of information. The model is estimated for the Hang 
Seng and Bangkok S.E.T. indices for a period surrounding the Asian crisis, 1981-2006. The 
paper therefore adds to the contagion literature by proposing a completely novel view on the 
notion of contagion. Furthermore, the heterogeneous agents literature is enriched by applying 
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a representative agent with multiple information sources in a model with multiple asset 
markets. Furthermore, the daily frequency is used, which is higher than has been done before 
when estimating heterogeneous agents models to our best knowledge. 
 Estimation results indicate that the fund manager indeed uses the different information 
sources in forming expectations on the Thai and Hong Kong stock markets; all three sources 
are found to be present. Second, we also find that there is switching between the sources; that 
is, agents change their strategy conditional on past performance of the rules. Over time, large 
shifts in behaviour are observed, caused by crises, but also by market development.  
 Concerning the behaviour of the fund manager at the onset of the crises, we observe 
that the crisis in Thailand is triggered by a shift of focus towards the fundamental price. The 
crisis in Hong Kong is triggered in first instance as a result of increased focus on information 
from the Thai market, but also from an increased weight put on the fundamental price. We 
therefore find evidence of the existence of shift-contagion. 
 Future research in this field can spread into different directions. First of all, theoretical 
knowledge of the behaviour of heterogeneous interacting agents models with multiple asset 
markets is relatively limited. The focus thus far has been primarily on single asset markets, 
while global financial markets are becoming more and more interrelated.  In the application of 
heterogeneous expectations models to the contagion issue, one can think of enhancing the 
two-market model to a multi-market model. In this way, it might be possible to distinguish the 
exact spread of a crisis across different countries. Finally it will be interesting to determine 
the exact triggers of changing behaviour. In this paper we have mainly focused on the 
behaviour of market participants, and matched turning points in an ad-hoc fashion with 
economic events. Knowing that behaviour of agents changes resulting from certain shocks is 
one, the next step is to determine why it changes. 
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Figure 1: Market and Fundamental Prices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Figure 1 presents the (log real) market and fundamental prices of the Hang Seng and Bangkok 
S.E.T. The fundamental prices are determined by the dynamic Gordon model, Equation (11). 
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Figure 2a: Weights 
Figure 2b: Smoothed Weights 
Notes: Figure 2 represents the weights of the three groups wh,t as estimated by the model. Upper plot for 
daily weights, and lower for smoothed (3-months moving average) weights. FUN represents 
fundamentalists; CH chartists; INT internationalists. TH is Thailand and HK Hong Kong. W is weight and 
WS smoothed weight. 
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Figure 3: Weights during the Crisis 
Notes: Figure 3 depicts the evolution of the weights wh,t for both Hong Kong (left) and Thailand 
(right) during the Asian crisis. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
 PHK P*HK ∆PHK  PHK- P*HK  PTH P*TH  ∆PTH PTH- P*TH 
 Mean 8.905 8.798 .0002 0.215 6.495 6.422 .0000 -0.034 
 Median 9.047 8.892 .0000 0.261 6.513 6.517 .0000 0.050 
 Maximum 9.904 9.763 0.172 1.045 7.932 7.253 0.113 0.935 
 Minimum 7.478 7.700 -0.405 -1.034 5.497 5.241 -0.161 -1.459 
 Std. Dev. 0.574 0.505 0.017 0.348 0.663 0.513 0.015 0.446 
 Skewness -0.442 -0.290 -2.695 -0.762 0.262 -0.617 -0.056 -0.577 
 Kurtosis 2.192 2.500 63.106 3.871 1.774 2.303 11.921 3.049 
Notes: Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of the (log real) prices Pi, fundamental 
prices P*i, price changes ∆Pi and misalignments Pi-P*i of the Hang Seng and Bangkok 
S.E.T. stock markets. 
 
 33
Table 2: Estimation Results 
 
 Without Switching  With Switching 
 Hong Kong Thailand  Hong Kong Thailand 
 Fundamental 
1θ  
-0.003868 
(.002589) 
0.003954 
(.002955)  
-0.002354 
(.001921) 
-0.002827* 
(.001617) 
2θ  
0.006220** 
(.002869) 
-0.003743** 
(.001811)  
0.001382 
(.002205) 
-0.001364 
(.001229) 
  
 Technical 
1α  
0.260726*** 
(.042639) 
0.371904*** 
(.033186)  
0.603185*** 
(.069016) 
0.214028*** 
(.023803) 
2α  
-0.188653*** 
(.025051) 
0.195676*** 
(.026185)  
-0.218999*** 
(.010448) 
0.325016*** 
(.040337) 
  
 International 
1β  0.214865*** (.041981) 0.121852*** (.046693)  0.242656*** (.039186) 0.231034*** (.041332) 
2β  0.007581 (.054382) 0.345272*** (.028040)  0.071765 (.049292) 0.300922*** (.041412) 
  
 Switching 
γ     -34.42849*** (7.736372) 
-20.71975*** 
(3.828655) 
  
 Log Likelihood 
 18341.41 18797.55  18373.04 18795.85 
Notes: Table 2 presents the estimated coefficients and standard errors (in parenthesis) of the 
system in Equation (9), without (left two columns) and with (right two columns) switching 
mechanism, for Hong Kong and Thailand. *, **, *** represents significance at the 10, 5 and 
1% level, respectively. 
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Table 3: Estimation Results Sub-Samples 
 
Notes: Table 3 presents the estimation results of Equation (9) for the three sub samples 1981  1990 (pre-crisis), 
1991  1999 (crisis), and 2000  2006 (post-crisis). *, **, *** represents significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level, 
respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1981 - 1990  1991 - 1999  2000  2006 
 Hong Kong Thailand  Hong Kong Thailand  Hong Kong Thailand 
      
   Fundamental   
1θ  
-0.002 
(.003) 
-0.002 
(.003)  
-0.006* 
(.004) 
0.001 
(.007)  
-0.001 
(.003) 
-0.021 
(.018) 
2θ  
0.002 
(.003) 
0.005 
(.019)  
0.018 
(.029) 
-0.001 
(.003)  
-0.060 
(.073) 
-0.002 
(.003) 
      
   Technical   
1α  
0.962*** 
(.151) 
0.579*** 
(.049)  
0.682*** 
(.117) 
0.719*** 
(.103)  
0.091 
(.073) 
0.429** 
(.188) 
2α  
-0.215*** 
(.030) 
0.717*** 
(.053)  
-0.231*** 
(.014) 
-0.056 
(.046)  
0.310* 
(.170) 
-0.218*** 
(.023) 
      
   International   
1β  -0.116 (.073) 0.197** (.078)  0.418*** (.059) 0.119** (.055)  0.038 (.055) 0.042 (.082) 
2β  0.067 (.121) 0.273*** (.025)  0.143* (.077) 0.599*** (.096)  -0.161** (.074) 0.276*** (.084) 
      
   Switching   
γ  -32.310** 
(13.693) 
-2.710*** 
(.418)  
-25.547*** 
(6.529) 
-16.415*** 
(5.096)  
-196.143 
(170.238) 
-162.545* 
(88.755) 
      
   Log Likelihood   
 6910.414 7868.775  6139.289 6018.055  5345.539 5121.220 
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